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Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

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FROM THE UNO:

Two Proposals by the Yugoslav Delegation to the UN
General Assembly

The Position of International Democratic Organizations Today
(Miodrag Avramović)

For or Against Secret Diplomacy and Spheres of Interest (Rade Vlkov)

The Roots of the Present Policy of Denationalization in Pirin
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After the Resolution on Korea

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Zapotocki and the Question of Economic Blockade

Notes on a Trip to England

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA

M. Marceau's Tale About A Land He Never Saw

EDITORS: DUSHAN TIMOTIYEVICH AND ZDRAVKO PECHAR

Review of **INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

**THIS MAGAZINE IS A FREE FORUM
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LOCAL AND FOREIGN WRITERS ON
VARIOUS PROBLEMS IN INTERNA-
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IN THE CAUSE OF PEACE



— GO ON, HAND AN EMBER TO TOVARISHTCH VISHIN-
SKY TO SIGN HIS RESOLUTIONS. ("Jež" — Beograd)

Review of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

EDITORIAL COMMENT

AFTER THE RESOLUTION ON KOREA

SOUTH Korean troops, and the troops from other countries fighting in Korea, have passed the 38th parallel. The General Assembly Resolution, proposed by Great Britain together with seven other delegations, has been adopted. The question which has been asked so often in the recent past has finally been answered in Korea and in Lake Success.

The main question has remained unanswered, however: the question of Korea's future. It was brought up in 1945, after the defeat of Japan. It was not solved at that time but a provisional boundary line was drawn between the Russian and American zones along the 38th parallel. This halfway, provisional solution through the intervening years led to an armed conflict which put Korea's future before the United Nations under conditions that have so far caused terrible suffering for the Korean people.

All these circumstances and the sacrifices and sufferings involved placed a great responsibility on the United Nations. It should be kept in mind, however, that the correct solution of the fundamental problem in Korea — the development of an independent, united and democratic Korea — is very important for the success of the UNO in carrying out its main task — the consolidation of peace and international co-operation in the world.

On June 25th this year, the United Nations were faced with the task of preventing the spread of the armed conflict, provoked with the aim

of extending the power of the North Korean Government, aided by the Russians, to all of Korea. Today, however, there is a danger that the General Assembly Resolution will lead to an imposition of the South Korean Government on all of Korea.

Such tendencies, which are the legacy of the previous division of Korea into two zones, are apparent in all discussions on the Korean problem. However, the first precondition for the successful realization of the aspirations for which the Korean people have been fighting for decades under Japanese colonial rule is precisely the elimination of such points of view.

Proving the formal and legal justification of continuing the military operations against the North until final victory is of secondary importance. In Korea, the United Nations is not faced with a legal question but with a political problem, on the solution of which the future of a long-suppressed people depends.

It is useless to call the southern government "the legal government" which was attacked, just as it is useless to propose today that Korea should decide her own affairs without any interference from outside. One cannot go far with this as a point of departure. One can only worsen the situation in Korea which would put the Korean people in a position of even greater dependence and injustice.

It is impossible to ask the Koreans simply to consider the North

Korean Government as the aggressor and the South Korean Government as the legal one. It would be equally impossible to disregard the happenings of the last three months and ask the UN to pursue a policy of non-intervention. The unpopular government of Syngman Rhee, which remained a minority in the elections held before the conflict broke out, has become no better by dint of the fact that the North Korean troops invaded South Korea.

In the eyes of the Korean people, the conflict in Korea cannot be separated from the struggle of opposing views on the internal system of Korea. The United Nations must not lose this from view. Ignoring this internal political problem could place the United Nations face to face with even more difficult problems than the ones they must cope with today.

The General Assembly Resolution on Korea will require great political wisdom from those who will have the task of putting it into force. Its contents are directed toward intervention in the internal political problems of Korea to such an extent that it would be difficult to imagine its application without violation of the right of the Korean people to self-determination. Let us take, for instance, the strained interpretation of this Resolution which authorizes MacArthur to pass the 38th parallel. According to the newspapers, even the General himself did not look at the text this way, although it is not very probable that he would be inclined to

want to stop at that line. However, passing over the 38th parallel is, in any case, one of the most important political problems in the solution of the Korean question. Such a method of interpretation of the whole Resolution can lead to a whole series of acts in the near future which would not be in accord with the principles of the UN Charter.

The premature abandonment of the attempt to approach a fundamental discussion of the entire problem in a sub-committee of the General Assembly's Political Committee was, to say the least, a serious omission. One need not, naturally, overestimate the possibilities of reaching a unanimous agreement, but the very result of the voting on the proposal to set up a sub-commission and the withdrawal of India from the new UN Commission for Korea are sufficient indication that the decision was made too hastily.

The reasons why such a decision was reached by the majority of delegations in the General Assembly must undoubtedly be sought in circumstances which are not directly connected with Korea. The conflict in Korea, in the last analysis, did not break out because of Korea itself, and this explains its exceptional importance. The events in Korea reverberated far more loudly throughout the world than any other post-war event — including the war in Palestine.

Keeping in mind the broader framework of world events within which the Government of North Korea served as the bearer of an expansionist policy, and the conflict in Korea as test of the relationship of forces, one must register the sad fact that very little effort was invested in seeking a peaceful solution of the conflict.

One of the consequences is already obvious — extensive all-round increases in armaments. Thus we have the paradox whereby an action by the UN to prevent war has been accompanied by increased armaments in general. This, however, cannot be justified merely by the attitude of the USSR, which by

its boycott of the UN took upon itself the greatest part of the responsibility for the development of the conflict in Korea.

It is necessary for both sides in the UNO to see the necessity to take serious steps in the interests of peace.

The only way the United Nations can contribute to world peace in the Korean question is to help the Koreans, and not to offer them tutelage or to punish those who have already been victimized.

A Survey of the UN General Debate

ONE of the characteristic features of the UNO's General Assembly debate this year lies in the fact that the delegates of various countries dwelled less on the specific questions on the Assembly's Agenda, also less on questions of special interest to their countries, and far more on general questions of peace, international cooperation and on the role which the United Nations should play in this respect. Nevertheless, one can hardly say that this year's General

Debate was sharper than in previous years, which could easily have been expected in view of the present international tension. One can even say that the speeches delivered by the representatives of the big powers were somewhat more moderate. This applies in particular to Mr. Vyshinsky when comparing his present speeches with those delivered in the past.

There is no doubt but that the Korean issue dominated the General Debate. We do not here refer so much to the actual events in Korea as to the fact that these events underlay many of the questions which the delegates dealt with in their speeches.

In the first place the General Debate showed that aggression as such under the present international conditions cannot remain isolated, that every aggressor, no matter how skillfully he might conceal his actions, will have to reckon with having the greater part of the states in the world against him.

The General Debate further emphasized the international significance of the United Nations and the role which it can play in mobilizing the world public opinion and in rallying the countries throughout the world against any action which would constitute a menace to peace, a violation of peace or would be an act of aggression. This is best borne out by the case of Korea where 53 states backed the Security Council's Resolution, regardless of the objections raised against it, and promised to take part in the action against aggression.

The international significance of the UNO was recognized even by those who thought they could walk out of all its bodies and carry through their action by circumventing the United Nations. The USSR returned to the Security Council and came to the General Assembly. Moreover, its representatives deemed it fit to wave an olive branch to the other UNO members in the course of their speeches.

The General Debate also showed that the USA in the UNO's General Assembly took maximum advantage of the errors of the Soviet policy towards Korea. This was evidenced



Franjo MRAZ: A YOUTH

in the first place by the fact that the contradictions among the countries of the Western world were manifested in a far lesser measure in the debate this year than earlier, and that Mr. Acheson at the General Assembly was able to come out with proposals which he would have hesitated to present so openly in earlier years.

However, although a general anxiety over the present international tension was manifested, the General Debate is distinguished by the fact that almost all the delegations expressed the view that it was possible to do something towards maintaining peace and advancing cooperation among peoples with a view to finding a way out of the present situation. Hence, this year we heard a larger number of proposals concerning questions of peace and international cooperation than any time earlier.

Nevertheless, judging by the substance of the proposals, in the first place of those submitted by the big powers, it can hardly be said that they showed a desire to put an end to their earlier practice of submitting proposals solely with the object of realizing some of their special interests in the UNO or of achieving specific propaganda effects. Thus, Acheson's proposal on the creation of an international military force ignores the objections which might be raised from the viewpoint of the Charter, while Vyshinsky's proposal to ban the use of atomic weapons, reduce armaments and form a pact of the five big powers is nothing but the usual, many times repeated, Soviet propaganda manoeuvre.

On the other hand, the proposals submitted by the Yugoslav delegation on the establishment of a Good Offices Commission and on the duties of state in case of war, as well as the proposal made by India's delegate at the beginning of the General Debate, for the admission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations Organization, constitute real contributions to peace and international cooperation.

An Example of Soviet Control of Foreign Trade Relations of the Eastern European Countries

THE British House of Commons towards the end of this month discussed export control measures with the purpose of preventing shipments of strategic material to the USSR and its satellites. The outcome of this discussion was that Great Britain prohibited the export of a number of drill-presses to the USSR and Poland which had already been ordered and were to have been delivered shortly.

The representative of the Polish Embassy in London reacted to this British measure, declaring that the Polish Government, in case Britain cancelled her obligations, would take corresponding measures to re-establish a balance of exchange. As Great Britain is still short of sufficient supplies of timber, the first rumours had it that Poland would ban the export of timber to Great Britain. However, when this rumour began spreading, the Polish Government hastened to deny it. It, moreover, declared that it intended to adhere strictly to the British-Polish trade agreement. The Polish agents of the USSR took this step on Soviet instructions. The aim of the Soviet Union is to prevent a possible reduction of trade between Great Britain and Poland so that it might squeeze out as much as possible for itself out of the latter

Britain. However, when this rumour began spreading, the Polish Government hastened to deny it. It, moreover, declared that it intended to adhere strictly to the British-Polish trade agreement. The Polish agents of the USSR took this step on Soviet instructions. The aim of the Soviet Union is to prevent a possible reduction of trade between Great Britain and Poland so that it might squeeze out as much as possible for itself out of the latter

The Polish denial is undoubtedly not an adequate reply to the British ban on exports. Because they lack independence, Poland and the other Eastern European Cominform countries are unable to fight against certain economic measures applied against them by the Western countries and the USA, just as they were unable to resist the USSR's pressure to wage an economic blockade against the People's Republic of Yugoslavia. And just as they had to renounce their vital interests then, so now they are compelled to do it again. The case of Poland's ban on the export of timber to Great Britain is the best proof of this.



Anton HUTER: ILOK (Chalk)

EDITORIAL COMMENT

Zapotocki and the Question of Economic Blockade

IN a speech held at Prague on September 28th, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Antonjin Zapotocki, has tried to enlighten the Czechoslovak proletariat on the question of economic tasks, or rather on the difficulties and discrepancies occurring in the country's economy due to the ever growing subordination of Czechoslovakia to the USSR. On the same occasion he also referred to the question of the economic blockade as applied in a certain fashion by USA and the Western countries against USSR and the countries subordinated to the latter.

Zapotocki found that "the economic blockade represents an ancient trick of imperialist capitalists wielded against those who refuse blind obedience to their will". He failed to mention that economic blockade, as an instrument of aggression, is being applied against Yugoslavia both by USSR and the countries subordinated to it, among them also Czechoslovakia.

However, we bear witness to the fact that the economic blockade as an instrument of pressure is not inherent in the capitalist system alone, but in the USSR as well. What is more, the blockade conducted against Yugoslavia by USSR boasts certain specific features unlike any that had been previously recorded in international economic relations. One such feature is that all the Cominform countries have been forced by USSR to join in the blockade regardless of the extent of damage wrought to their own vital interests through the action. Another is that the blockade involves the application of methods unprecedented in the history of the development of civilised society.

The practice of the USSR leaders in this respect — in strict observation of adherence to the principle of profound, utmost discrepancy between words and deeds — has produced an extra set of conditions for the imposing and execution of determinate aims and intentions, and is marked by extreme vehemence and brutality. It has produced a special type of international relations, founded in economics on the crudest kind of exploitation, and on subordination ad nauseam in the field of politics. Being what they are these relations offer no possibility for combatting the economic blockade.

Zapotocki further sates that the weapon of blockade had been applied against USSR during the initial stage of her socialist development, and that the weapon proved helpless. That is true, but the blockade was then fought successfully by the entire Russian revolutionary proletariat. Had Zapotocki cared to introduce a more topical and concrete note, he could have reached for another and far more recent example — the case of Yugoslavia. However, Zapotocki absolutely avoided to consider this question from the angle of mobilisation of the masses of the people for combatting the economic blockade. He spoke instead about the pressing need for a rapid and effective re-orientation of Czechoslovak economy so as to reduce its dependence on the Western countries. Overlooked was the fact that the process worked both ways, i. e. that reduced dependence on the one side would inevitably lead to increased dependence and subordination on the other — in the direction of the Soviet Union, which goes on imposing ever harder economic and political terms.

Herr Grotewohl and the "Two-Child" System

IN the midst of the present dangerous international tension, with all the countries' agenda featuring problems of vast economic and political significance, and the very future of peace at stake, etc., the Prime Minister of the East German Government, Otto Grotewohl, took the floor in the Parliament to deliver a speech reminiscent of many pronouncements that emanated from Berlin in the recent past, both during and after the Second World War. Its central theme was an appeal to Germans to abandon the "two-child system" and to embark on a more prolific one. Coming as it did in the midst of the present world situation, the speech sounds grotesque. If, on the other hand, Grotewohl thought he had to dwell on the theme, and precisely now, regardless of all the other more pressing problems of the hour, it can but mean that the issue was one of substantial concern to the leaders of the Soviet Zone, that it had assumed such critical urgency that it could no longer be glossed over.

In any event, it is easier to cope with the subject in a declarative fashion (i. e. the one adopted by Grotewohl) than to analyze the reasons underlying the advent of this "system". It certainly takes less effort to launch slogans than to admit the decline in the birth rate and admit that the "two-child system" is the outcome of determined economic conditions, whose elimination would primarily involve the abolition of the exploitation of East-ern Germany by the USSR.

It defies all imagination to guess why such slogans need to be highlighted at this very moment, and what useful ends they could be made to serve.

TWO PROPOSALS BY THE YUGOSLAV DELEGATION TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY

EXPRESSING worry about the present situation in the world, the majority of delegations which took part in the general debate at Flushing Meadows posed two questions: is it possible to preserve peace and can the United Nations play an effective role in that respect. The Yugoslav Delegation answered in the positive — through Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj in the general debate, and by all its work so far. It maintained that it was possible to preserve the peace and that the United Nations could serve that end successfully.

What is more, under the present conditions, the threat of war can be diminished and overcome primarily through the United Nations as a universal international organization. During the five years of its existence, however, the UNO has not only not been strengthened as an instrument of peace but it has, on the contrary, grown constantly weaker. This is mainly due to the fact that certain harmful tendencies have grown to ever greater proportions in the UN and paralyzed its work, thereby undermining the trust of peoples in this international organization.

First of all, there is the tendency to turn the UNO into a propaganda tribune instead of consolidating it as the supreme international organ for the promotion of constructive work where all nations can, with goodwill, sit down around the round table and consider various questions. Their aim would be to seek and find common solutions through international cooperation, respecting mutual interests and rights, primarily those of the interested countries.

The second shortcoming in the work of the UNO so far is the tendency of the contradictions between the great powers to become the determining factors in its work. For this reason, the base of international cooperation in the UNO constantly tended to narrow down, being reduced in the final analysis to relations between the two great powers around which the majority of the other countries take up positions. The small and the medium-sized states did not play that role in the UNO which they should and could play.

The consequence of this was that the representatives of the big powers, immediately started making propaganda speeches as soon as they

approached a question which had the effect of making the problem at hand more acute instead of solving it. Exploiting their prestige and keeping their own interests foremost in mind, the big powers were often a stumbling block to the peaceful solution of various questions.

The fact that these tendencies became so widespread may be blamed, to some extent, on certain shortcomings in the organization and working methods of the various UN organs. Although the UN Charter offers ample opportunities for the development of the mechanism of international cooperation, these possibilities were not correctly or fully utilized.

These shortcomings were also pointed out at earlier sessions. What is more, attempts were even made to eliminate them and the General Assembly voted in several resolutions on international cooperation, procedure, and so on. However, the weak point of these attempts was that they did not succeed in rallying all the member-States and that they were subjected to certain justified complaints. Such was the case with the foundation of the so-called Little Assembly.

Keeping in mind the imperative need to eliminate the existing obstacles to the consolidation of the UNO and the realistic conditions and possibilities, the Yugoslav Delegation submitted two proposals which were placed on the agenda of the General Assembly: a proposal on the establishment of a permanent commission for good services and a proposal on the duties of states in case of outbreak of hostilities.

The first proposal was that a permanent international commission for good services should be formed as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly. It would be made up of the six non-permanent members of the Security Council and six other members, elected by the General Assembly, who are not permanent members of the Council. The commission would consider international disputes and problems, regardless of whether or not they are on the agenda of any of the UN organs. This it would do from the angle of finding and exhausting all the possible means for their peaceful solution. Its task, then, is to put itself between the disputing parties and develop the greatest possible initiative and experience in the peaceful solution of these questions by way of agreement. In each parti-

cular case, the commission would examine the situation to see if the dispute could be solved by way of direct negotiations and would advise the interested parties to that end. If the permanent commission found that the international dispute, in the strict sense of the word, could be solved by way of mediation either by the Commission itself or by some other state or person, it would consult with the parties to the dispute and advise them to accept the mediation. It would then offer them all possible services, both in the negotiations surrounding acceptance of the procedure to be followed, and in the mediation itself. On its part, the permanent Commission could offer the parties its good services in order to facilitate the negotiations on acceptance and implementation of some other manner of peaceful solution of the dispute, viz. by way of an investigation, conciliation, arbitration. As far as the solution of questions of substance is concerned, the Commission would limit itself only to acknowledging and considering the matter and informing the parties of all suggestions made in that connection. But the Commission would not make any of its own conclusions regarding these suggestions.

"In a word," said Minister Kardelj in his address during the general debate, "the commission we are proposing would act as a kind of catalyst. In spite of the present tension in international relations, it would make possible the widespread application of the method of direct talks and negotiations on questions which would otherwise be the topic of talking battles for years to come".


In accordance with its aims, the Commission would avoid any unnecessary publicity so that the discussion would not take on the character of propaganda. The Yugoslav proposal is a new one in substance. It is also an innovation because it takes into account the complaints which might be made against it. It emphasizes, for instance, that the Commission would not undertake any of the affairs which belong to the jurisdiction of the Security Council or any other organ of the UNO.

Apart from this, the Yugoslav Delegation, declaring that the Yugoslav Government is ready to conclude agreements on permanent peace and non-aggression with every one of its neighbors, submitted a proposal on the duties of states in case of outbreak of hostilities. The purpose of the proposal is to make aggression more difficult and especially to make it impossible to disguise aggression. It is a well-known fact that aggressors always try to make it seem that they were the victims of aggression, justifying their actions, for instance, by the right of self-defense. In essence, the proposal is that every state, under any conditions

whatsoever, finding itself in armed conflict with another state, must declare its readiness, at the latest within a period of 24 hours, to cease hostilities and withdraw its armed forces from alien territory. It would then have to implement its declaration within 48 hours if the opposing side makes the same declaration. By way of this short and simple procedure, then, states which do not act in the manner provided for put themselves in the position of aggressors, without any opportunity of making excuses, and will have to bear the responsibility for upsetting the peace. Not only would such a state be shown up before the public opinion of the world as the aggressor, but this procedure would make it easier for the Security Council to undertake measures provided for in the Charter in case of aggression.

The two proposals submitted by the Yugoslav Delegation make up a whole. Apart from the proposal on the permanent commission for good services, whose aim is to advance international cooperation for the solution of disputed questions, the proposal on the duties of states in case of outbreak of hostilities would represent an additional obstacle for an aggressor. These proposals put forward by the Yugoslav Delegation are a powerful contribution to peace and international cooperation under the present conditions.

N. DJOKIĆ



Milorad PESIC: A NOVI BEOGRAD SCENE

FOR OR AGAINST SECRET DIPLOMACY AND SPHERES OF INTEREST

SINCE the dawn of diplomacy — the diplomacy of tyrants and satraps of ancient epochs, of absolute feudal monarchs, of the times of papal intrigue and during 20th century imperialism — this craft had been cultivating and perfecting a special form of activity designed to uphold the power of the ruling circles over the people — an active secret service and secret diplomacy.

Each word uttered or set down in secret documents, in a host of treaties and protocols, has spelled ordeals and devastation to millions of human beings through wars, pogroms, conquests and diverse other sanguinary squarings of accounts.

The activities of secret diplomacy have been condemned by different thinkers, especially during the period of the revolutionary battles of the young capitalist class. Voltaire, for example, said that history was echoing with the sound of wooden shoes climbing and of satin slippers descending its stairs. Discernible through this traffic, though, are also the hushed footsteps of those who prefer the backstairs for their comings and goings.

However, the first clear challenge was to come from Marx himself. In his "Basic Manifesto of the International Workers' Alliance" he saw the perils to which the peoples were exposed through the workings of secret diplomacy, and at the same time raised the battle cry against it. He called on the working class to be vigilant of the activities of its governments and to be particularly watchful of the secrets of international politics.

And the first revolutionary act in the history of mankind's struggle against secret diplomacy was the "Decree on Peace", issued in November, 1917. It appealed to all peoples and states to conclude an equitable peace, without annexation and indemnities. It said:

"The Soviet Government rejects secret diplomacy and declares to be determined to conduct all negotiations quite openly before the entire people, and forthwith to proceed with the complete publication of secret agreements confirmed or concluded by a government of large property holders and capitalists..."⁽¹⁾

And, indeed, the Soviet government proceeded to publish the secret documents. A seaman named Markin was in charge of this work. Within less than two months, during December, 1917, and January, 1918, there were published seven volumes of the "Collection of Secret Documents".

The documents which had been published, as laid down in the "Official History of the Civil War in USSR", "...exposed the robber policy of the czarist government and the whole system of secret agreements".⁽²⁾

And in the preface to the "Collection of Secret Documents", seaman Markin wrote thus:

"The working men of the whole world should be made aware as to how, behind their backs, the diplomats, installed in their cabinets, traded away

their lives... How they entered into shameful agreements... Everybody must know the mode in which the imperialists, with one stroke of their pen, went on to appropriate entire provinces. How they soaked battlefields with human blood. Each document published represents a weapon against the bourgeoisie..."⁽³⁾

The "Decree on Peace" heralded a new era of openly arrived at and equal relations between peoples. Panic gripped the imperialist diplomatic circles and their governments whilst the working men of all lands welcomed with joy the unmasking of secret plans. Even the "Arbeiterzeitung", the organ of the Austrian Social-Democrats, who otherwise gave their support to the war effort of the Austrian imperialists, had to admit that the publication of the secret documents by the Soviet government represented an act whereby the democratic mask of both the Entente imperialists and of their Austro-German counterparts had been torn away. ("Arbeiterzeitung" of January 28, 1918).

Dealing with the significance of the "Decree on Peace" and the publication of the czarist government's secret documents, Lenin stated the following in his report on peace to the Soviet congress on November 7, 1917, viz.

"Every government is reluctant to disclose the trend of its thoughts. But we are against secret diplomacy and shall act openly before the entire people".⁽⁴⁾

And again, at the 1st congress of the All-Russia Navy: "We have been responsible for publishing secret agreements and we shall go on doing so. No amount of malice and calumnies whatsoever shall be able to stop us along that road... It is both possible and compulsory to carry on the closest cooperation with the revolutionary class of working men of all countries. In publishing the secret agreements the Soviet government had set its foot on that path. That is not verbal propaganda, it is the propaganda of deeds".⁽⁵⁾

Indeed, the "Decree on Peace" was no mere verbal propaganda. As laid down in the official "History of the Civil War in USSR", it had "...formulated the basic principle of the entire foreign policy of the Soviet state".⁽⁶⁾ (The author's italics).

In other words, both Marx and Lenin were agreed that the struggle against the evil of secret diplomacy and the rejection of secret agreements and undertakings represented no temporary tactical expedient, but that it constituted a component part, "the basic principle of the foreign policy of the Soviet state".

Were these principles destined to survive for long in the subsequent evolution of the Soviet Union?

They formed a subject of discussion in 1925. At this stage, Stalin still stood up in their defence. Answering questions at the Sverdlovsk University, Stalin

(3) "Collection of Secret Documents from the Archives of the Former Foreign Ministry", No 2, p. 1, 2nd Edn., Petrograd, Published by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, 1917

(4) Lenin, Works, XXII, p. 16.

(5) Lenin, Works, XXII, p. 101-102.

(6) "History of the Civil War in USSR", vol. II, p. 30.

(1) Lenin, Works, p. 14, Gosizdat, Moscow — Lenin-grad, 1929.

(2) "History of the Civil War in USSR", vol. II, p. 576.

spoke of the danger inherent in the lack of faith in the international revolution of the proletariat, about the damaging effect of the sceptical attitude toward the national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, that the Soviet land could not have resisted world imperialism without the support of the revolutionary movements of other countries, about the dangerous nature of such concepts, and then went on to say:

"That is the road to nationalism and degeneration, the road leading to the complete liquidation of the international policy of the proletariat, since those afflicted by this disease view our country not as one particle of a whole, but as the beginning and the end of this movement, deeming that the interests of all the other countries should be sacrificed to those of our own country". And further: "Should the liberation movement of China be upheld? And why? Would it not be dangerous? Would that not engender strife with other countries? Would it not serve a better purpose if we established 'spheres of influence' in China together with the other 'progressive' states and if we severed something off China to our own advantage? That would be both useful and would involve no danger... Whether to uphold the liberation movement in Germany? Is it worth the risk? Would it not be better to reach agreement with the Entente powers regarding the Treaty of Versailles and earn something in compensation?... Whether to preserve the friendship with Persia, Turkey, Afghanistan? Does it all pay? Would it not be better to revive the 'spheres of influence' with some of the big states? And so on along similar lines.

"Such is the nationalistic 'conception' of the new type which endeavours to liquidate the foreign policy of the October revolution and which stimulates the elements of degeneration".⁽⁷⁾

Subsequent events were to show Stalin himself, with the present leaders of the Soviet Union, to have unscrupulously turned round on these words of his and liquidated "the foreign policy of the October revolution".

It is not within the scope of this article to expound in fuller detail the process of degeneration of the once principled Soviet foreign policy and to list the manifestations of the growing revisionism in the realm of the Soviet state's international relations.

We might, however, recall the following:

Instead of extending support to Germany's revolutionary movement, there materialized the German-Soviet rapprochement in 1939-41, the secret agreements on the division of the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia), the fourth division of Poland; in brief, various secret agreements and protocols covering the division of spheres of influence between the Nazi German and the USSR governments.

In lieu of "upholding the liberation movement in China", there were understandings with Chiang Kai-shek, and subsequently "with other 'progressive' states" as well, the lot to the detriment of the Chinese people's fight for liberation.

Instead of supporting the "national liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries" ("that elementary requirement of internationalism") — there ensued new secret agreements — with fresh partners this time — about the division of spheres of interest, secret agreements leading to the liquidation of the struggle for national liberation of the Greek people, propagandistic and diplomatic aid to the emi-

grant government of King Peter, secret agreements which tended to liquidate the achievements of the Yugoslav people's struggle for liberation, and that on the cynical "fifty-fifty" business principle.

Instead of the "international policy of the proletariat" there developed "elements of degeneration" and nationalism, relations of inequality between peoples, mastery was gained by the principle that "the interests of all the other countries should be sacrificed" ⁽⁸⁾ to the interests of one country alone.

Stalin had thus become the initiator and executor of precisely such a nationalistic conception which he himself, in his speech at Sverdlovsk University (on June 9, 1925), had described as the most dangerous attempt at the "liquidation of the foreign policy of the October revolution..."

Were the revisionist Soviet leaders able to conceal from the eyes of the world the facts surrounding the liquidation of the foreign policy of the October revolution, to maintain the secrecy of their obscure diplomatic relations, understandings and agreements?

No, they were not. Their partners in the scramble for dominant positions and spheres of influence went on to publish some secret documents of their own.

And just as Lenin's "Decree on Peace" in 1917 precipitated a panic among the imperialist governments and the latter's diplomats, the Soviet leaders were to find themselves in a similar predicament after the Second World War. They tried to prevent the publication of documents concerning the German-Soviet relations, or at least to prevent the unilateral elaboration of such documents. The following passage occurs in the preface to "The Documents and Material Preceding the Second World War", published by the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948, viz.

"In 1945 the Soviet Government proposed to the British Government that the German documents be jointly elaborated, and insisted that Soviet experts be granted permission to participate in such work. However, the proposal of the Soviet Government was turned down".⁽⁹⁾

The said publication carries no trace of any attempt to refute the documents published in "The Nazi-Soviet Relations in 1939-41" but presents other documents on British-German relations. The Soviet Union, thus, voices its protest merely against the unilateral elaboration and publication of such documents.

And what principled statement have the Soviet theoreticians and historians of diplomacy been currently advancing on the subject of secret diplomacy?

The latest edition of "The History of Diplomacy" comprises an entry entitled "Secret and Confidential Agreements" — which goes as follows:

"Parallel with overt, public and published agreements, secret and confidential agreements are concluded between states".⁽¹⁰⁾

That is all. From the first to the last word. Nineteen words all told, with the title to the chapter thrown in.

It follows that the present Soviet leaders have forgotten the "Decree on Peace", the words of Marx, Lenin and of seaman Markin, but they will never be forgotten by the peoples of China, Spain, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia and the other countries behind whose backs the Soviet grand-state secret diplomacy had been trading in their lives, and still proceeds to do so.

Rade VI.KOV

⁽⁸⁾ Words and sentences quoted are excerpts from the preceding quotations of Stalin's speech, Works, Vol. VII, p. 167-168.

⁽⁹⁾ "Documents and Materials Preceding the Second World War", I, "30 Dana" Publishers, Beograd, 1949.

⁽¹⁰⁾ "The History of Diplomacy", III, p. 812, Moscow, 1945.

⁽⁷⁾ Stalin, Works, VII, p. 168.

THE POSITION OF INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS TODAY

WRITING about the significance and role of international democratic organizations today, when so many of them are under the direct control of the Soviet leaders, may seem a useless task. What can be done, some of the discouraged democrats may say, when the leaders of these organizations are not leading them at all but simply carrying out Soviet orders. The matter is all the more serious, will add some of the foreign communists who think with their own heads — and their number is increasing, because the leaders of these organizations, most of them members of communist parties, are intoxicated with the supposedly wise leadership of the Soviet Union and thus covering up their own inability and ignorance with idol worship. Actually, the significance and role of these organizations must be talked about. Although the international progressive, and primarily the working class movement now finds itself in a serious crisis thanks to the Soviet-Russian digressions we think that the international democratic mass organizations, must be returned to progressive mankind and that this is worth fighting for. This is an important fighting program for all true democrats, for all revolutionaries. That is why we are bringing up the topic.

The international democratic mass organizations appeared during a period of increasing tension in the general crisis of capitalism, especially after the victory of the first socialist revolution. Their importance has undoubtedly been enhanced after the Second World War which was fought for the idea of equality between big and small nations, for the right, of small nations mostly, to national self-determination and for the longest possible peace. This war, more than any other preceding event, brought people with common misfortune together and forced them to the conclusion that only unified struggle could defend their common rights and interests. This awareness and general practical experience made possible the rapid establishment of many new international democratic mass organizations. The forces of reaction were rocked and, one might say, silenced for a period of time.

The first task that was set was the consolidation and strengthening of internationalism, international solidarity among progressive people of various groups, classes and professions in the struggle for comprehensive improvements in economic and cultural life, in every other sphere. There were formed the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Federation of Democratic Women, the International Student Union, the International Journalists' Organization, the World Committee of Partisans of Peace and many others.

The main conditions for successful work of these international mass organizations are the principles of equality of all national participants, mutual discussions, permitting expression of other, even incorrect points of view and full freedom of debate and struggle of ideas. Here, the question of national prestige must not be a decisive one, because this is a matter of general interest. The entire thing is changed and becomes the opposite of what it should be if one of the equal members comes along with the conception that

it is the only one that is always right in all questions, that there must be no discussion, that the wisest one must be obeyed by right of the first born. This is what lies behind the idea that one country has the most authority because everything in it is the best possible and that nothing anywhere else is worth anything, beginning from the everyday way of life to the smallest achievements of culture and the arts. No one else, according to such a conception, deserves credit for the present development of science and technique except that one country. In that case, the international organizations become servile executors of orders coming from headquarters in one country which is looking after its own interests and subjecting everything else to its own big-power aspirations. Then we do not have an international organization, but a foreign branch of the dictatorial organization of one country.

Such is the case today when the Soviet leaders have become bosses in the international democratic organizations. Perhaps it is possible to boss the obedient, bureaucratic communist leaders of a good many communist parties who are not at all close to the people, and their representatives in the international mass organizations, for whom such behavior is a condition for keeping their posts. Things have gone so far that the Soviet leaders determine who shall be the leaders not only of the parties but of the national mass organizations as well. But it is not so easy to boss around the rest of the progressive people in the international and national progressive mass organizations, or the communists who think with their own heads or other freedom-loving people who see the truth and what is and what is not in the interests of toiling humanity.

Under the present international conditions when the progressive, and especially the communist, movement in the world has reached widespread proportions, it is impossible, needless and even harmful to direct them from one center. No one can set down for all states and all people the rules and regulations by which they are to work and fight for a better life. Of course, there are and there must be general principles of struggle primarily in the struggle for peace. But they cannot be subordinated to anyone's special interests as the two big powers, the USA and USSR, wish. On the contrary, the basic task of all international democratic organizations — the struggle for peace, can be carried out only against the wishes and demands of the two big powers to turn all other peoples and states into a means of bribery in their conflicts over new division of the world into spheres of influence.

The dispute between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and Yugoslavia in general with the Cominform, headed by the USSR, brought to the surface the hegemonistic stand of the Russian leaders and the support of that stand by their satellites in the international democratic organizations. When Yugoslavia opposed the Russian dictation and intervention in her internal party and state affairs, the entire Cominform propaganda machinery was turned against her. It attempted to brand the Yugoslav leaders as servants of imperialism, as fascists. After it was decided to thus relegate Yugoslavia to the fascist—Trotskyite camp, it was permissible to use against her all sorts

of economic, political and other kinds of pressure and discrimination. Thus, without any discussion and in the absence of Yugoslav representatives, it was possible to expell Yugoslavia, at orders from Russia, from many international organizations under the pretext that she was, "as confirmed at the Budapest and Sofia trials", (which, in effect, were farces) a fascist state and could therefore not be a member of the international democratic organizations.

This Soviet policy put the democratic organizations to a test and brought them a serious crisis. The expulsion of Yugoslavia caused, first, a weakening of the unity of democratic forces; second, it meant the justification and legalisation of the undemocratic, unsocialist and warmongering acts of the USSR which were carried out against the other countries under Soviet control, too, which would be, if necessary, carried out against any other country as well.

In spite of the flagrant pressure being brought to bear on the international and national democratic mass organizations by the Soviet leaders they still meet resistance. Last year, the French Committee for Peace refused to adopt a resolution calling Yugoslavia a fascist and warmongering country. The delegates from Republican Spain rose against the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the International Lawyers' Association. The distinguished American public worker and political personality, John Rogge, sent a Resolution in June of this year to the Plenary Session of the World Committee of Partisans of Peace in which he demanded that an invitation be extended to adherents of peace in Yugoslavia to attend the coming World Congress of the Partisans of Peace.

The discriminatory attitude of the Secretariat of the International Journalists' Organization also led to corresponding consequences. The International Journalists' Organization has virtually ceased to exist as a genuinely international organisation. In addition to Yugoslavia, the organisations of Great Britain, France, Sweden, etc. have also left this body.

At last year's Congress of the International Students' Union in Prague, the British delegate opposed the discriminatory acts of the leaders of the World Federation of Democratic Youth against the Yugoslav youth. The progressive British organization, the National Peace Council, several American public figures and many other freedom-loving people and democratic organizations decided, in response to the invitation of the Yugoslav National Committee for the Defence of Peace, to send their representatives to Yugoslavia to see for themselves whether aggressive preparations against her neighbours are taking place here. They have expressed the wish to visit also the neighbouring Cominform countries with the same object. Last summer visits were paid to Yugoslavia with this aim by American, British, and other public and cultural workers. However, the authorities in the Cominform countries bordering on Yugoslavia refused to grant permission for their entry into those countries. The reasons underlying this refusal are understandable when analysed in the light of the present aggressive Cominform policy.

There are, therefore, tendencies in the international democratic organizations to break with this practice of blind obedience. An increasing number of members of these organizations is becoming conscious as to where such practice is leading. They realise that, for the sake of saving the unity of the international democratic movement and restoring the reputation of international democratic organisations, it is necessary to emancipate these organisations as soon as possible from dependence on any great power whatsoever and to proceed most energetically to return them to the service of the interests of all progressive mankind.

Miodrag AVRAMOVIC

The Roots of the Present Policy of Denationalization in Pirin Macedonia

THE Cominform agents in Bulgaria are preparing the ground for resettlement of the people of Pirin Macedonia to the southeast, into the border regions from where they are now forcibly moving the Turkish minority. The people living in the shadow of the Pirin Mountains, are now being subjected to final denationalization by these new measures to separate them from compact masses of the Macedonian people, a part of whom have set up their own state within the framework of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia.

The past of the Macedonian people has both its bright and its dark side. From the moment of their national awakening, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, they have had to fight for economic and national emancipation from the oppression of the Turkish feudal system. They have also had to defend themselves from the tendencies of the incipient bourgeoisie of neighboring countries to make a colony of them. In this strenuous struggle against the enemies of their national independence, the people of Pirin Macedonia have made great sacrifices and they are still doing so today.

In the common struggle of the Macedonian people against denationalization, Pirin Macedonia has had its own special bright spots in history. The Pirin Mountains sheltered many national heroes, the famed Haiduks who fought in select groups against the Turkish oppressors and all alien attempts to bring misfortune to the Bulgarian people. Local insurrections were frequent, like the ones in Kresna and Razlog on October 9 and November 16th respectively, in 1878.

The creation of the VRMO (Vnatsrasna Makedonska Revolucionarna Organizacija — Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) in 1893, headed by Goce Delcev, represented the inception of organized struggle by the Macedonian people. One of the principles of the VMRO, as a real national, progressive organization and a higher form of expression of the national consciousness of the Macedonian people, was stated in the words of Goce Delcev: "The liberation of Macedonia can only be carried out by Macedonians themselves." Through the initiative of Goce Delcev and associates, even the means for organization and purchase of arms were collected only from their own sources and all the activities of the organization were adjusted in every respect to the employment of domestic forces.

The influence of VMRO in Pirin Macedonia was very widespread. This is especially true of the work of Goce Delcev himself who came to Bansko in 1896 as a teacher, and of his closest associate Jane Sandanski, who was born in this same place. In propagating the aims of the VRMO, they linked national liberation up with economic and social emancipation, and the liquidation of the feudal landlord system. The activities of Goce Delcev and his comrades from the VRMO, their close connections with people who were spreading socialist ideas, and the mass participation of the Macedonian people in the organization, were very disturbing especially to the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the court. In Sofia, a Supreme Committee was formed of mercenary scoundrels. Through these people, known under the name of Supremists, armed detachments were set up and operated throughout Macedonia especially in the mountainous regions of Rile, Rodopa, Pirina and Meleseveci, where about 250,000 Macedonians live. The detachments had the task of infiltrating into

the VMRO organization and, through their agents, of paralyzing the influence of Goce Delcev, Jane Sandanski and others. The Supremists did not restrict their activities to the above, however. They also staged local rebellions to incite the anger of the Turkish authorities against the VMRO and its people. Even that was not enough for them, so they organized the assassination of Goce Delcev, and later Jane Sandanski and others.

Through their hangmen, the Supremists, the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and court succeeded in 1910 in usurping the Macedonian organization, and transforming the national and progressive VMRO into a gangster-like, and later into a monarcho-fascist organization. The great organizers, popular spokesmen and revolutionaries Goce Delcev, Jane Sandanski, and many others were substituted by Todor Aleksandrov, Aleksandar Protogerov, Petar Culev and later Vanca Mihajlov. The activity of VMRO, as an organization of bandits, was concentrated mostly around Pirin Macedonia, because it was to have served as a jumping-off place for the denationalization of all of Macedonia, and its annexation to the "mother country", to a united Bulgaria.

Although the Bulgarian bourgeoisie and the court were in the past the main culprits for the reactionary and denationalizing policy pursued toward the Macedonian people, they were not the only ones. The Bulgarian socialists, known as the "narrow socialists", who later became communists, (and also the "broad" ones who were already at that time well-known for their revisionism) had an opportunistic attitude toward the Macedonian question. We know of the unofficial statement made by Georgi Kikrov, Secretary of the BRSDP ("narrow" socialist) during the Balkan Wars: "Words are one thing and deeds are another. Macedonia is Bulgarian and it is to remain so". Even the greatest authority in the Party at that time, Dimitar Blagojev, did not think otherwise, although he was of Macedonian descent himself.

It is not at all odd, therefore, that the leaders of the "narrow" socialists were hypocritical in their behavior toward Dimitrije Tucovic, leader of the Serbian social democrats. This was demonstrated when the "narrow socialists" refused the invitation of Dimitrije Tucovic to attend the second Balkan Conference. As a pretext, they claimed to have some sort of principled stand on the question since the "broad" socialists had also been invited to the conference at the request of the Croatian social-democrats. However, the leadership of the "narrow" socialists that had refused to take part in the conference of Balkan social-democratic parties, which was supposed to offer moral support to the Macedonian people, did not mind at all departing from its "principled" stand and signing a document, through Georgi Kikrov, which justified the denationalizing policy of the government of Ferdinand Coburg in Macedonia. In their opportunism and dogmatic blindness, the leadership of the "narrow" socialists had an even more backward point of view than the agrarian party of Stamboliski when it came to the roamings of the VMRO organization of bandits in Macedonia and the threat to the democratic liberties of the Bulgarian people. Not only did they not support the armed struggle of the rebelling Bulgarian troops in 1918 after the defeat at Dobro Polje and the creation of the Radomir republic in Pirin Macedonia, but they did not even perceive the danger from the activities of VMRO which was preparing the June 9th coup. They emphasized that they had again taken some sort of principled stand on this question, summed up in the words: "Let the city and village masters give each other a good beating". The fact that this coup was actually directed against the working people of town and country, primarily against the most progressive class, the

working class and its vanguard, the workers' party, seems to have been of very little significance for them at all.

The opportunistic stand of the leadership of the Communist Party of Bulgaria on the national question of Macedonia, has not changed much even in the era of the Fatherland Front, which began after September 9, 1944. The only one faithful to internationalism, in words as well as deeds, was Georgi Dimitrov. But the correct policy determined by him on the Macedonian question, and its application in Pirin Macedonia, was paralyzed even by his closest associates in the Politburo and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Party.

At the end of 1946 and the first half of 1947, something was done to give Pirin Macedonia cultural autonomy. But the operation of a Macedonian bookstore in Gornja Sumaja, the inauguration of a Macedonian theatre and schools with sections where the Macedonian language was taught, were still looked upon at that time as something suspicious. Finally, when it was felt that the spreading of Macedonian culture was taking on increasing magnitude, sinister forces from the Central Committee started their work. Through men of the type of General Damianov and similar persons enjoying the patronage of the USSR, it was discovered that there was an "urgent need" for some of the most prominent Macedonians, men who had taken part in the liberation struggle with the units of our Army, to withdraw from work in the field and become active in the Bulgarian Army. Even at the end of 1947, they were sent to garrisons in Eastern Bulgaria as military leaders.

After the Cominform Resolution, the hypocrisy of the leading Bulgarian communists came to the surface in short order, despite the announcement on which Georgi Dimitrov had insisted — that the dispute between the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) did not mean a cessation of cooperation between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Overnight, the cultural autonomy of Pirin Macedonia was liquidated, and all work on the dissemination of Macedonian culture and the national independence of Pirin Macedonia was stopped.

Lenin's words to the effect that socialists of an oppressing nation, if they do not propagate secession of the oppressed nations, are not socialists, or internationalists, but chauvinists, can be applied in their entirety to the leaders of the Communist Party of Bulgaria.

The most recent undertaking by the Cominform agents in Bulgaria to resettle the people of Pirin Macedonia, thereby subjecting them to ultimate denationalization, are not far different from the methods which the Supremists used to employ in the past as agents of the Bulgarian court and bourgeoisie.⁽¹⁾ What the Supremists did not succeed in doing with knife and bomb for the benefit of the creators of the San Stefano Bulgaria, is now being done under the banner of false internationalism and the protection of the "great teachers and authorities" from the USSR. In this case, the Bulgarian Cominformists are not only manifesting extreme chauvinism, but are acting like the propagators of the policy of conquest of their patrons from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government. They do not stop at any means in menacing the independence and freedom of other people for the purpose of imposing hegemony upon them and realizing their own and their masters' imperialistic aspirations. St. STOJILJKOVIC

(1) A valuable contribution for the elucidation of the policy of denationalization, past and present, toward Macedonia and especially Pirin Macedonia, is Dimitar Mitrev's book "Pirinska Makedonija u Borbi za Nacionalno Oslobođenje" ("Pirin Macedonia in the Struggle for National Liberation"), published by the Principal Committee of the People's Front of Macedonia, Skopje 1950.

THE TORQUAY CONFERENCE

THE organisers of the recently held conference at Torquay, England, are showing a tendency to attribute a remarkable significance to the event as a means for increasing international trade. It must be recalled, however, that similar conferences held in the past, at Geneva and Annecy, which sought the same objective, had failed to exercise any major influence on the volume of international trade exchanges. Although the number of the customs privileges mutually granted by the participating countries ran into several thousand, it is to be noted that they mainly covered commodities of secondary importance, and that no appreciable practical advantages did accrue from these steps.

The first and basic contradiction about to loom large at Torquay is the contrast existing between the low-tariff countries and those adhering to a high protective tariff policy. The countries of the first group, particularly Belgium and some Scandinavian countries, will demand substantial reductions in the customs tariffs not only of U. S., but of France and Germany as well. In doing so, however, they do not regard themselves as bound to grant any concessions on their own part, having long ago, with their liberal import policy, sufficiently contributed to the expansion of international trade. Many obstacles will have to be overcome before the conference could meet the desire of such countries, since the tariffs of some economically stronger ones (Germany, France, Italy) had been considerably raised recently with a view to securing corresponding economic concessions in return for a subsequent reduction of same. This expedient was resorted to in emulation of U. S. customs policy, after the signatories of the "General Tariff and Trade Agreement" (GATT) had adopted at previous conferences the quid pro quo principle in their dealings, namely the granting of concessions solely in compensation of concessions obtained.

The conference is bound to witness an assault by the politically and economically weaker countries on another principle established at the preceding GATT conferences — the principle of the "leading supplier". According to the provisions of the "General Agreement", customs concessions may be asked from a partner only by that country which is his largest supplier of the commodity involved (in which case the benefits naturally extend to all the other member states). The practical meaning of this provision is that the interests of the "leading supplier" countries will frequently restrain them from insisting on a tariff reduction so as to uphold their positions — the very fact that they hold first place in the import of individual countries signifies that they had already managed to render inoffensive all the other competitors there.

According to certain information, the delegations at Torquay will endeavour to secure some advantages also in such spheres which bear no strict relation to the customs tariffs themselves. The French, for example, will demand the regulation of the international market for certain key raw materials, both in respect of distribution and prices. At the same time a whole series of countries is due to support another French proposal which is in line with the American policy — the demand for the abolition or at least considerable reduction of the British imperial preferential tariffs.

The type of British reaction to be expected on that score is anything but difficult to guess: a most vehement resistance to any attempt, no matter how limited in scope, levelled at the privileges Britain keeps holding at the cost of so much effort.

Western Germany is to appear for the first time at these GATT negotiations. It will try some skilled manoeuvring with her new customs tariffs in order to gain the highest possible concessions in connection with the export of her pharmaceutical, chemical and optical products to the other GATT member states.

The U. S. government, on whose initiative the present session had been actually called (many countries had favoured its postponement both because of the present world political situation, and because nothing special is expected to result from it), is likely to support the majority of the demands for reduced customs tariffs. Tariff concessions in combination with the liberalisation of imports, namely the gradual abolition of quantitative restrictions between the Marshall Plan countries and the functioning of the European Payments Union, are assigned a major role in the smoothing out of the last obstacles in international trade. The countries of Europe, whose renunciation of certain foreign exchange and commercial-political instruments was mainly due to tenacious U. S. insistence, however, have come to regard tariffs as the only effective weapon still left to them for the implementation of their separate aims and the safeguarding of their interests.

As regards other issues, the question of competition between capitalist states for the capture of suitable markets could scarcely arise amidst the current boom brought about by the war preparations. The difficulties met in obtaining all sorts of supplies, from raw materials and consumer goods to capital investment goods, would be a rather more opportune topic for discussion just now. In such circumstances customs tariffs cease to represent barriers capable of obstructing the marketing of eventual export surpluses. It may, therefore, be assumed that the Torquay conference will be able to achieve a measure of success since the many countries will not consider it necessary to oppose the demands for tariff reductions.

In contrast to the American efforts, the West European delegations on their part will bid for a reduction in U. S. tariffs, which would help their countries to increase their exports to U. S. A. and improve their payments balances and dollar reserves. Although the U. S. government has been making repeated promises to do so, it has so far failed to effect any appreciable reductions in its high customs tariffs. In so far as the attitude of the American delegation should prove more yielding in this respect, the other countries would be more disposed to grant concessions on their own part. The outcome of the Torquay conference will, therefore, be largely determined by the tenacity with which the U. S. A. will pursue its views and on its readiness to grant the concessions demanded for its import duty reductions.

O. A.

NOTES ON A TRIP TO ENGLAND

"It is with satisfaction that I noticed that you (the working men of England — Z. P.) have none of that awful curse of national prejudices and national arrogance which in the long run are nothing but general selfishness. I noticed that you hold dear all who seriously turn their forces to the progress of mankind — be he an Englishman or not — and that you admire all that is great and good regardless of whether it is nurtured in your native land or not".

These words of Friedrich Engels, which I read and noted while still in Belgrade, have been fully confirmed during my visit to England where I often came into touch with these same men either in West Ham or in Lanesmouth, in Pigswode or in Leeds, in Birmingham or in London, with these men who have even further developed these virtues of which a great and cultural people can truly be proud of. At the same time we realized how important it was to see conditions in another country with one's own eyes and to become acquainted with the life of its people.

MANY of the great, classical works by Charles Dickens are being translated in Yugoslavia today. During our sojourn in England, a prominent state official who knew that Dickens was very popular in Yugoslavia, thought it necessary to point out that the England of today differs from that of Dickens' time, from Victorian England. And that is indeed true. But I should like to underline that the England of today also differs greatly from the pre-war England (before World War Two) and that these differences are palpably manifested in the life of the broad sections of the population and in the economy of the country. Whereas mass unemployment before the war was the usual thing — in 1939, for example, there were 1,349,600 unemployed — today the Labour Government has ensured full employment to workers. In 1949 there were only 243,000 unemployed which means 1.6 per cent of the total number of workers (with manpower shortage, for example, in the mining areas). A visible result of

the nationalization and modernization of mines is a higher living standard of the miners as compared with the pre-war period, so that today miners in England, especially pit workers, are better off than ever before. If we are to grasp to the full extent the successes achieved by the Labour Government in eliminating unemployment we should recall that after the war the Government was faced with the difficult problem of closing down a whole series of military establishments while simultaneously securing jobs for about four million men who worked in those plants, and finding work for the demobilized troops who were at a truly rapid rate leaving their units. The certainty of full employment a constant increase of production and a better distribution of the national income, can be felt at every step in that country, and the Labour Party rightly considers this its biggest success. All this eloquently bears out that the present-day England differs greatly not only from the England of Dickensian times — ruin of weavers in the textile mills, debtors prisons, unbearable conditions of life in the factories, working days of 15 to 16 hours, etc. — but also from the pre-war England.

AT the time of the struggles for Parliamentary reforms, Free Trader William Cobbett, addressing the men of England in 1816, wrote in his paper the "Political Register":

"I beg of you to employ peaceful and lawful means, but at the same time to work zealously and with determination so as to attain the goal".

These words of William Cobbett, written almost one hundred and fifty years ago, reflect the deep-rooted conceptions of the English people and are also characteristic of the post-war course of Great Britain.

All those who refuse to realize that many reforms have been carried through in post-war England in a specific way — not according to patterns imported from abroad — are in fact denying, sully and belittling the significance of all that has been achieved in that country

in the field of nationalization, health, food-supply, etc. How and how much was done we shall not discuss here. The fact remains that Britain's economic position today is more favourable than it was earlier (a balance of payments has been achieved this year, coal output has increased, mining and transport are being modernized), that the Labour Government has, through the nationalization of steel, fulfilled one of its important electoral promises and added a very active branch to the nationalized industries. Thus one fifth of the country's wealth has so far been nationalized in Britain. It is also a fact, which we checked on the spot, that the free health services in Britain are at a truly enviable level. In order to ensure real wages to the working people, the Government from its budgetary means grants 410 million pounds of subventions annually for essential foodstuffs (guaranteed), etc., etc. By means of progressive income tax assessments, huge inheritance taxes, which the Labour Government has increased, the capitalists in Britain have been prevented from gathering in a good deal of all they accumulated before the war. (The main share-holder of a big sugar refining trust died some time ago. His heir had to pay huge inheritance taxes, and the British papers write today that if he were to die shortly a greater part of the property of the trust would go to the state in the form of inheritance taxes). The capitalists endeavour to evade these heavy payments by means of various devices.

All that we were able to see during our one-month's sojourn in Britain eloquently bears out that her people are building up their future in their own specific way and that the role played in this respect by the Labour Government is important and decisive, that present-day England differs qualitatively from that of Dickens' times and that it would be difficult to find any internal force which would be able to turn back all that has been achieved by the people of Britain. And that these achievements are no small ones is best confirmed by the anxiety of the big capitalists who feel they are hard hit by the latest steel nationalization measures and who are doing all they can to prevent the implementation of the law on the nationalization of this industry.

Zdravko PEČAR

THROUGH THE FOG OF PROPAGANDA

Mr. Marceau's Tale About a Land He Never Saw

WRITING ABOUT SOMEONE OR SOMETHING IS REALLY CONSIDERABLE EFFORT if the writer wants to describe the whole truth effectively for the reader. All suitable means are used to this end, various handbooks, newspaper and radio communiques, etc., etc. But if a person wants to write about something, especially the situation in a certain country, whether he is a writer or a newspaperman, the best thing for him to do is to visit that country and get the material for his work on the spot. Its value will then depend on his skill in writing and his realistic portrayal of the situation and events there.

Judging things from this angle, it would seem that it is even more difficult to write about a country without having any information on it, without knowledge of the facts, and particularly without having visited it. And that is the way it really is if one wants to give an objective portrayal or make a judgment. However, if all one wants to do is to reason arbitrarily and draw certain conclusions without knowing the facts, in the absence of any ethics whatsoever, then no intellectual effort is necessary.

The Athens correspondent of the Paris evening newspaper, "Le Monde", M. Marceau, avoided making any effort whatsoever in writing from Athens something that resembles both an article and a reportage about Yugoslavia, which his home office published on the third of this month. In his story, he was rather clumsy about linking up several factors which have no mutual connection whatsoever. First of all, he writes about "Titoism", by which he discloses what inspired his article. Then he goes on to complain about certain British correspondents in Belgrade whom he reproaches for being prejudiced about Yugoslavia, which they had visited or were visiting. In the meantime, he forgot from where he was "objectively"

writing about Yugoslavia, which he himself had never visited.

In order to conceal from his editors and the public the real buyer of his story, Mr. Marceau writes in a hodge-podge manner. He mixes two styles of writing: first, a standard anti-Yugoslav sentence or passage, and immediately following it one of Mr. Marceau's own additions. Finally, this double-duty newspaperman shows his cards, concluding his article with the assertion that it is inevitable that "Tito, since he wants to be independent, must pay the price".

Mr. Marceau's exposition of the "Yugoslav situation" itself is not so important, for it is the most ordinary kind of mass production item in which the public has no interest. What is interesting though, is the way a correspondent can deceive his home office, passing off on it a story camouflaged with apparent objectivity and pretty words which it would probably never ask him for since he is the correspondent from Athens, not Belgrade. But anyway, making up stories is not a new thing with dishonest newsmen.

THE BEST WAY TO AVOID DENIALS of false news is to wait a while and print the news after the publication of the denial itself. The latter may then be considered out of date in view of the earlier date of its publication. In such a case, a false news item, published after its denial, retains the semblance of truth for the readers of a certain newspaper who believe in it or who cannot or will not check up on the news. Or, at the very least, it remains a detail which sticks in their sub-conscious minds without their paying any particular attention to it.

The editorial boards of those newspapers and agencies which do not care about checking up on the facts are the ones who calculate

on informing and influencing their readers in this way. Their main aim is to keep on repeating one or more similar lies in various forms thereby creating an impression of truthfulness for the readers.

There are not a few newspapers and agencies using such tricks. Cominform propaganda is stone deaf to all denials not approved by Moscow. Certain newspapers in the West pursue a similar policy for their own special reasons. Along these lines, the Rome newspaper, "Messaggero", on the 29th of last month, published a story from London about "the British proposal to Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey that they form an anti-Cominform bloc of Western countries on the periphery".

In order to appear as truthful as possible, the "Messaggero" story claims that "British circles have for the present refused to confirm or deny the news about the establishment of the new Rome-Belgrade-Athens axis". The newspaper offers this news to its readers from its own sources despite the fact that the Italian ANSA Agency had sent out a similar communique from Reuters about the creation of such a bloc, following it up immediately, and correctly so, with the denial issued by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

M. D.

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